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fied by a valid factor unrelated to ec0-
nomic protectionism." Id. at 2024 
(quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988». 
Michigan and St. Clair County claimed 
that the amendments were not eco-
nomically motivated~ rather, they were 
intended to protect the health and safety 
of the citizens. ForlGratiol, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2026. The Court explained that 
"because [the] provisions unambigu-
ously discriminate against interstate 
commerce, the State bears the burden 
of proving that they further health and 
safety concerns that cannot be ad-
equately served by nondiscriminatory 
alternatives." Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2027. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 
131 (1986), the Court upheld Maine's 
ban on the importation of live baitfish 
because of parasites and other prob-
lems the nonnative baitfish posed. The 
Court concluded that Michigan's Waste 
Import Restrictions violated the Com-
merce Clause because the amendments 
failed to present a reason, apart from 
origin, why solid waste from outside 
the county should be treated differ-
ently from solid waste from inside the 
county. Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. at 
2027-28. 
The Court stressed that even if a 
legitimate goal were sought, illegiti-
mate means to achieve that goal may 
not be used. Id at 2027. Michiganand 
St. Clair County asserted that the re-
strictions were needed to allow coun-
ties to adequately plan for the safe 
disposal offuture waste. Fort Gratiot, 
112 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court ac-
knowledged that "although accurate 
forecasts may be an indispensable part 
of a comprehensive waste disposal plan, 
Michigan could attain that objective 
without discriminating between in- and 
out-of-state waste." Id at 2027. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the case should 
be remanded for consideration of 
whether the SWMA amendments were 
based upon legitimate local health and 
safetyconcerns.Id. at2028. TheChief 
Justice asserted that in light of the 
problems associated with the disposal 
of waste, Michigan was taking reason-
able measures to protect its citizens and 
was not constructing a form of ec0-
nomic protectionism. Id at 2028-29. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared, "the 
Cou rt today penalizes the State ofMichi-
gan for what to all appearances are its 
good-faith efforts, in tum encouraging 
each State to ignore the waste problem 
in the hope that another will pick up the 
slack." Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 
2031. 
In Fori Gratiol, the Court imposed 
a strict standard against the implemen-
tation of discriminatory waste import 
laws. The Court will strike down any 
statute that interferes with interstate 
commerce, unless a state can show that 
the restrictions were nece~sary to pro-
tect its citizens and that there were no 
less discriminatory options. In order 
for states or counties to enforce a waste 
management plan, the area that is to be 
protected must be held to the same 
standards that are imposed upon other 
counties and states. 
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen 
In re Criminal Investigation No. Jf 
242Q: ATTORNEY -CLIENT FEE 
RECORDS NOT PRIVILEGED 
FROM SUBPOENA. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recently held that requiring an attorney 
to disclose jury records ofthe fees paid 
by two former clients to a grand jury did 
not violate the attorney-client privi-
lege. In re Criminal Investigation No. 
Jl242Q, 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220 
(1992). The court emphasized that 
although Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules 
of Professional Responsibility, govern-
ing confidentiality, is broader than the 
attorney-client privilege rule in Mary-
land, it does not provide an absolute 
shield to prevent this information from 
being subpoenaed. 
As part of an investigation of known 
or suspected narcotics traffickers, the 
state routinely sought evidence of vio-
lations of the state income tax laws. 
The growing trend in narcotics investi-
gation was to seek evidence of expendi-
tures of large sums of money, includ-
ing attorney's fees, as a means of 
interpolating the net worth of a sus-
pect. For this reason, the Grand Jury 
for Anne Arundel County issued a 
subpoena duces tecum to attorney Wil-
liam H. Murphy, Jr. for the fee records 
of two of his former clients. 
In a motion to quash the subpoena, 
Mr. Murphy pleaded that he had ex-
pressly promised his clients that all 
information about fees "would be per-
sonal, privileged, and confidential 
because of, among other things, the 
growing practice of prosecutors na-
tionwide to use such information to 
establish violations of the narcotics 
laws .... " Id. at 6,602 A.2dat 1222. 
He argued that to reveal the informa-
tion in light of his client's express 
request that he not, was a breach of 
confidentiality . 
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County granted the motion to quash 
the subpoena on the grounds that ''the 
Maryland Rules of Professional Con-
duct have 'enlarged the general prin-
ciple of confidentiality. '" Id. at 3,602 
A.2d at 1221. On behalf of the grand 
jury, the State filed an appeal to the 
court of special appeals. Before the 
intermediate court heard the case, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
. land granted certiorari and reversed 
the circuit court's decision, holding 
that Rule 1.6 and the judicial applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege 
rule are distinct concepts. The court 
found that Rule 1.6 does not enlarge 
the attorney-client privilege rule in 
Maryland. 
The court of appeals began by ana-
lyzing Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Citing the 
prefatory material to the Rules, which 
stated: "Moreover, these Rules are not 
intended to govern or affect judicial 
application of either the attorney-cli-
ent or work product privilege, the court 
rejected the lower court's contention 
that the adoption of this rule by the 
Maryland legislature affectively ex-
panded the attorney-client privilege." 
Id at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221 (quoting 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
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Rule 1.6). The attorney-client privi-
lege, which "applies in judicial and 
other proceedings in which a lawyer 
may be called as a witness or otherwise 
required to produce evidence concern-
ing aclientL]" was distinguished from 
client-lawyer confidentiality, which 
"applies in situations other than those 
where evidence is sought from the 
lawyer through compulsion of law." 
Id at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222. The court 
concluded that because Rule 1.6 ap-
plied in all situations, except where the 
protected information was requested 
under compulsion of law, the rule of 
confidentiality was broader in scope. 
Applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to the instant case, the court found 
that the information sought was be-
yond the scope of the privilege. The 
client's explicit request that informa-
tion be kept confidential did not create 
a privilege under the law. While the 
court acknowledged that the attorney-
client privilege is necessary to our le-
gal system in order to assure that cli-
ents do not hesitate to seek legal advice 
or to confide in their lawyers, the court 
qualified this observation by noting 
that "[t]he privilege is not absolute; it 
does not restrict disclosure of every 
aspect of what occurs between the at-
torney and the client." Id. at 11, 602 
A.2d at 1225. 
The court noted that a clear major-
ity of jurisdictions have held that re-
quiring disclosure of attorney's fees 
did not violate the attorney-client privi-
lege. Attorney's fees were an expected 
part of the relationship and to some 
extent the client was involved with the 
attorney in an arms-length transaction 
that was collateral to the privileged 
relationship. Id. at 7, 602 A.2d at 
1223. 
The court described three general 
exceptions to the rule requiring disclo-
sure of attorney's fees. The "legal 
advice" exception would apply where 
the "disclosure of the information 
would implicate the client in the very 
matter for which legal advice was 
sought in the first case." Id. at 7,602 
A.2dat 1223 (quotingIn re GrandJury 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d 
363 (9th Cir. 1982». Another excep-
tion called the "last link" had been 
applied where only the client's identity 
was sought. The "communication ex-
ception" had been applied when "dis-
closure of the client's identity or the 
existence of a fee arrangement would 
reveal information that is tantamount 
to a confidential professional commu-
nication." Id at 9, 602 A.2d at 1224. 
The court, however, concluded that 
these exceptions were "ill-defined and 
overlapping" and in any case, distin-
guishable from the case. Id. at 7, 602 
A.2d at 1223. 
Judge Bell, in the lone dissent, 
agreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of Rule 1.6, as well as with the 
conclusion that the instant case did not 
fall under the recognized exceptions 
where the attorney-client privilege 
would be implicated. He dissented, 
nonetheless, because he found the ra-
tionale presented for the majority's 
holding that fee information was not 
'confidential unpersuasive. Id. at 16, 
602 A.2d at 1227. Payment of 
attorney's fees, he contended, was at 
the core rather than collateral to the 
attorney-client relationship and should, 
therefore, be privileged. Id. at 19,602 
A.2d at 1229. 
By allowing the subpoena of attor-
ney fee records, the court has given 
prosecutor another avenue for collect-
ing evidence in the zealous hunt for 
drug traffickers. Presumably evidence 
offees paid to an attorney would not be 
the only available evidence to estab-
lish the net worth of a suspect. More 
importantly, knowing that his 
attorney's fee records are likely to be 
subpoenaed in any future action against 
him, an individual accused of a crime 
involving large sums of money will 
think twice before he establishes this 
record. Allowing ready access to fee 
records may at some point conflict 
with Maryland's clear public policy of 
encouraging accused citizens to seek 
legal assistance without fear oflack of 
confidentiality. 
- Dianne Moorehead Hughes 
UnitedStatesDep'tofEnergyv. Ohio: 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PRO-
TECTED DEP'T FROM CIVIL 
PENAL TIES FOR PAST VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT AND RESOURCE CONSER-
VATION RECOVERY ACT. 
In United States Dep 't of Energy v. 
Ohio, 112 S. Ct 1627 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the 
Department of Energy ("DOE'') is ex-
empt from state and federal civil pen-
alties for past violations ofthe Clean 
Water Act ("CW A") and the Resource 
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA''). 
The Court held that because Congress 
did not expressly waive the federal 
government's sovereign immunity con-
cerning past violations of the CW A 
and the RCRA, the federal government 
may only be liable for coercive fines 
which prospectively modify behavior. 
In 1986, the State of Ohio sued the 
DOE for improperly disposing ofhaz-
ardous wastes from its uranium pro-
cessing plant in violation ofthe CW A 
and the RCRA. Relying on the federal 
facilities and citizen suit sections of the 
CWA and the RCRA, Ohio pursued 
both state and federal civil penalties 
for the DOE's past violations of these 
laws. The federal facilities sections 
govern the extent to which federal op-
erations are subject to the CW A and 
RCRA statutes. The citizen suit sec-
tions allow private individuals to en-
force the CW A and RCRA. Ohio 
brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Ohio, which held that 
the CW A and the RCRA federal facili-
ties and citizen suit sections waived 
federal sovereign immunity for civil 
penalties. Holding that Congress 
waived immunity in all but the RCRA 
federal facilities section, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affmned in part and reversed in 
part. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether 
Congress waived immunity for puni-
tive fines in the CW A and the RCRA. 
The Court began its analysis by 
stating the common rule "that any 
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